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ABSTRACT 
 Long duration space flight crews have relied 
heavily on almost constant communication with ground 
control mission support.  Ground control teams provide 
vehicle status and system monitoring, while offering near 
real time support for specific tasks, emergencies, and 
ensuring crew health and well being.  With extended 
exploration goals to lunar and Mars outposts, real time 
communication with ground control teams and the 
ground’s ability to conduct mission monitoring will be 
very limited compared to the resources provided to 
current International Space Station (ISS) crews.  An 
operational shift toward more autonomy and a heavier 
reliance on the crew to monitor their vehicle and 
operations will be required for these future missions.  
NASA’s future exploration endeavors and the 
subsequent increased autonomy will require a shift in 
crew skill composition, i.e. engineer, doctor, mission 
specialist etc. and lead to new training challenges and 
mission scenarios.  Specifically, operational and design 
changes will be necessary in many areas including: 
Habitat Infrastructure and Support Systems, Crew 
Composition, Training, Procedures and Mission 
Planning.  This paper will specifically address how to 
apply ISS lessons learned to further use ISS as a test 
bed to address decreased amounts of ground support to 
achieve full autonomous operations for lunar and Mars 
missions.  Understanding these lessons learned and 
applying them to current operations will help to address 
the future impacts of increased crew autonomy for the 
lunar and Mars outposts and pave the way for success 
in increasingly longer mission durations.   
INTRODUCTION  
 Long duration space flight crews have relied 
heavily on almost constant communication with ground 
control mission support.  Ground control teams provide 
vehicle status and system monitoring, while offering near 
real time support for specific tasks, emergencies, and to 
ensure crew health and well being.  With extended 
exploration goals to lunar and Mars outposts, real time 
communication with Earth and the ability to conduct 
mission monitoring will be very limited compared to the 
resources provided to the current International Space 
Station (ISS) crews.  An operational shift toward more 
autonomy and a heavier reliance on the crew to monitor 
their vehicle and operations will be required for these 
future missions.  Communication constraints, operator 
limitations, system complexity, and many other factors 
prevent complete human control of many functions and 
lead to the need for automated systems (Jónsson et al., 
2007).  Effective implementation of autonomy practices 
for the upcoming lunar and Mars spaceflight missions 
will depend on the crews’ expertise and a strong level of 
trust in the mission support systems. This will require a 
shift in crew skill composition, e.g. engineer, doctor, 
mission specialist etc. and lead to new training 
challenges and mission scenarios.  Each crew is 
planned to be composed of a physician and paramedic-
skill level.  Mission tasks for lunar and Mars sorties will 
include surface operations such as traverse; drilling, 
coring, or sampling objects; and assembly of structures 
and habitats, etc (Jónsson et al., 2007). When ground 
support is unavailable, trust in the automated systems 
that support the crew and their missions is critical to 
support true autonomy.  In addition to a more profound 
reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI), increased 
automation traditionally requires operators’ roles to 
change substantially.   
 Increased automation and less reliance on the 
human, is one of the biggest issues NASA faces for the 
lunar and Mars missions. AI has been used successfully 
to support autonomous functions, but has been limited to 
those functions that are known and well-defined. As 
exploration endeavors are expanded to new habitats 
and unknown territories on the lunar and Mars surface, 
there will be more unidentified and ill-defined operational 
parameters (Jónsson et al., 2007). Application and 
integration of greater AI elements within a space vehicle 
and habitat will need to focus on technologies that 
empower the human to be autonomously successful 
while providing enhanced tele-operational capabilities 
(Jónsson et al., 2007). However, many operational 
parameters for the lunar and Mars missions are currently 
not well-defined.  New technologies will need to be 
evaluated for their utility and suitability to this application, 
specifically with regard to what will be reasonably 
achievable in terms of crew tasks and activities, e.g. 
medical care, surface operations, science activities, 
mission reporting, etc.  Communication latencies and the 
distances from key communication points, such as the 
Earth, will require the crew to be capable of activities 
such as, diagnosing and treating a range of medical 
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issues autonomously, e.g. illnesses such as flu, 
lacerations, trauma, toxic exposures, bone fractures etc. 
 Addressing crew and system needs for lunar 
and Mars outpost missions have already begun within 
the space industry, but opportunities and analog 
environments to address new constraints, such as 
autonomy, are limited.  Specific aspects of on orbit 
operations for lunar and Mars missions, can be partially 
addressed by assessing lessons learned from ISS long 
duration space flight data.  Historically, ISS has not been 
maintained or controlled in an autonomous manner, 
especially regarding crew interaction and support from 
ground control.  However, ISS provides an optimal 
opportunity to evaluate new technologies to address the 
new operational constraints introduced with lunar and 
Mars exploration.  
 As NASA embarks on exploration of new space 
destinations, lunar and mars habitats, ensuring the 
safety of space flight crewmembers will be of paramount 
importance. This includes addressing all activities and 
their associated hazards, these hazards can lead to 
decreased human performance and overall well-being 
including: unintentional errors, injuries, or illness. Safety 
hazards are best addressed by designing to incorporate 
human limits while capitalizing on their strengths with 
human centered design.  For the future, it will be 
important to focus on the activities, skills, hardware and 
systems that will lead to the success of the mission and 
facilitate autonomous operations.  Specifically, 
operational and design changes will be necessary in 
many areas including: Habitat Infrastructure and Support 
Systems, Crew Composition, Training, Procedures and 
Mission Planning to preserve the safety and well-being 
of the crew and mission success.  
METHOD 
 ISS human spaceflight data collection processes 
are continuous and the data is primarily qualitative in 
nature. This experiential data, unique to NASA 
operations for long-duration spaceflight, is collected at 
three different points in time during each mission: pre-
flight, in-flight, and post-flight.   
 Pre-flight is the time before a scheduled 
flight/mission. During pre-flight periods, crewmembers 
and human factors experts often evaluate the 
hardware/system for its usability, maintainability, and 
effects on habitability. These evaluations are 
documented via verbal commentary, quantitative and 
qualitative questionnaires, photographs, or audio/video 
recordings.   
 In-flight refers to the period of time from launch 
until landing. During in-flight periods, personnel in the 
Mission Control Center (MCC) and the Mission 
Evaluation Room provide on-console support for all 
onboard functions and tasks.  
 
 Post-flight is the period of time that begins with 
the crew’s landing back on Earth, and most crew 
debriefs are conducted post-flight. These debriefs 
provide an opportunity for NASA teams (e.g., human 
factors, engineering, payloads, medical operations, etc.) 
to obtain crew feedback to help address and collect 
detailed data regarding mission/Expedition issues and 
determine lessons learned for future missions.  
 The long duration spaceflight data is used to 
track and trend issues, and successes, over time to 
better address and identify areas that may need 
improvement and expertise that should be carried 
forward to the new exploration efforts.   
DISCUSSION 
HABITAT INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT 
SYSTEMS 
Habitat Infrastructure  
 A habitats’ infrastructure includes the design 
and configuration of the interior volume or space that 
encompasses the vehicle or habitat and supports all 
human activities. Specifically, nominal activities, 
translation, accessibility and anthropometric 
considerations (size, shape, or strength) contribute to 
habitability infrastructure.  In regards to ISS habitability 
infrastructure, overall ISS topology and stowage 
allocations of the living and working environment have 
presented many issues for the crew in terms of 
optimized functionality.  High traffic and incompatible 
activity centers were co-located together, which 
negatively impacted the crew’s daily activities and 
perceived level of habitability while on orbit (Rando et 
al., 2005).  The amount of stowage on ISS has 
surpassed the available storage allocations, causing 
many items to be stored in translation paths and causing 
obstructions.  This has caused the crew extra time to 
access stowed items including emergency equipment 
and fire port locations (Baggerman et al., 2004). 
Lunar and Mars 
For the lunar and Mars outposts the 
infrastructure considerations will need to be different in 
terms of effects of 1/6th gravity and navigation. The 
crewmember will no longer be able to adapt and 
navigate as easily around a poorly designed habitat or 
obstructions in the translation path, as on ISS with 0 
gravity conditions.  To fully understand the effects of an 
inefficient internal architecture, the ISS crew activities 
will need to be closely analyzed at assembly complete 
stage and a crew of six.  It will be important to utilize real 
time crew feedback opportunities on ISS with the larger 
crew sizes. Specifically, new evaluation processes 
should be created and instituted to take advantage of 
the real time monitoring ability available. These 
evaluation processes may include, viewing day-to-day 
crew interactions with the internal infrastructure via live 
or recorded video downlinks. Questionnaires may also 
be provided to capture real time comments associated 
with day-to-day operations within the given habitability 
infrastructure. Crew experience data from ISS has been 
primarily collected once the crew returns home and 
memories are not as fresh about specific aspects of 
daily living, such as frustrations with navigating around 
their habitat.  In addition it will be important that lunar 
exploration tasks be clearly defined prior to construction 
of the lunar habitat, i.e. use of task analyses to identify 
critical operational tasks that will drive interior design 
and layout of the habitat’s infrastructure.  It will also be 
beneficial, once tasks are clearly defined, that crew’s 
support “day” in the life or “week” in the life simulation 
evaluations in a fully functional lunar habitat mock-up. 
This will help identify unforeseen operation constraints at 
the concept design phase where it is easiest to fix.    
 
Support Systems 
 Habitat support systems include the design and 
maintainability of all hardware and systems that support 
human habitation and daily activities within a vehicle or 
habitat.  Problems with hardware and system designs 
can have a significant impact on the crew’s health, 
efficiency, training, etc.  For instance, if the hardware 
has a unique, or non-intuitive, interface the crew’s health 
could be in jeopardy in the event of a medical 
emergency.  Specifically, if the crew can not operate the 
medical equipment quickly and reliably a crewmember 
may not have a chance fir full recovery. This can also 
cause additional maintenance, planning and crew 
training time costs when the hardware does not 
capitalize on human capabilities. On ISS, hardware and 
system designs have proven problematic in terms of 
maintainability and usability. Many hardware items have 
required many tools to be maintained and to access and 
the additional time cost to crew schedules has been 
excessive.  Historically, many human factors 
requirements have been waived to support cost and 
scheduling impacts.  The inconsistent application of 
human factors design requirements has come at a cost 
of increased maintenance and less available time for 
activities, such as science and research.  In addition, the 
design of habitat hardware and systems were not 
standardized across ISS modules, which has also 
caused additional crew time and frustration with nominal 
living and working activities (Baggerman et al., 2004)  
Lunar and Mars 
 Many operational parameters for the lunar and 
Mars missions are currently not well-defined and new 
technologies will need to be evaluated once tasks begin 
to be scoped more clearly.  Specifically, what will be 
reasonably achievable in terms of nominal crew tasks 
and activities, e.g. medical care, surface operations, 
science activities, mission reporting etc.  Hardware, 
system and tool designs will have to be much more 
reliable to reduce maintenance and repairs needed, and 
complex interfaces minimized with more commonality 
designed into each operating system across the habitat. 
Without intuitive hardware interface designs and 
computer display systems, the crew will be less able to 
operate optimally and safely while trying to maintain a 
fully autonomous state during lunar and Mars missions.  
Increasingly compact hardware and systems will place 
greater demands on the crew in terms of accessibility 
and maintenance.  Tool design and maintenance for 
hardware and systems will be more difficult due to their 
size and limited accessibility, and complexity.  The 
designs will need to maximize human capabilities and be 
designed to be easily used and maintained for the crew, 
such that operation of the item is implicit or conveyed by 
design.  It will be important to minimize the total number 
of tools required and that all hardware and systems be 
maintainable with a set of common tools.  Iterative user 
design evaluations will also help to ensure that human 
centered design practices are clearly adhered to during 
developments and hardware and systems are easily 
maintained.     
CREW COMPOSITION  
 Optimal crew composition and positive crew 
interactions are a critical component of space missions.  
Factors including basic capabilities, personality 
characteristics, levels of training, level of rank within the 
crew, and culture can contribute to crew interaction and 
mission success.  All of the aforementioned factors have 
contributed in some manner to issues with crews 
between the crew and with ground support while 
onboard ISS, e.g. communication, task delegation, 
performance etc.  During early ISS missions, several 
communication frustrations were reported between the 
flight crew and ground personnel. Ground operators had 
difficulty understanding how much time it actually took to 
complete tasks on orbit, which caused stress and 
discord between the crew and ground.  The ground 
should have relied on the crew to do many things, and 
by effectively overriding some of the crew’s suggestions, 
the ground put the crew in unsafe situations. This was 
primarily due to miscommunications, unrealistic 
demands, ineffective interpersonal communication 
techniques and a lack of understanding of on-orbit life 
(Baggerman et al., 2004).  In addition, the ISS and its 
crew is representative of a multi-national partnership 
with different cultures co-existing in the same habitat, 
consequently accurate language translation and 
information conveyance has been problematic 
(Baggerman et al., 2004).  
Lunar and Mars 
 As ISS nears configuration complete stage, with 
multiple international modules and crews, an ideal 
opportunity is provided for evaluation of lunar and Mars 
analog activities. Lunar and Mars spaceflight crews and 
the subsequent autonomous aspects of these missions 
will require a shift in crew skill composition, e.g. 
engineer, doctor, mission specialist etc. and will lead to 
new training challenges and mission scenarios.  The ISS 
environment can be used to experiment and test lunar 
and Mars analogous crew roles and responsibilities.   It 
will be important to evaluate the effectiveness of cross 
training techniques in providing adequate flexibility for 
these missions. These skills will be necessary to allow 
for the crews to operate in a fully autonomous manner 
and easily adapt to changes during the missions.  
Focused task analyses with subject matter experts, 
onboard ISS or in simulated situations in ground based 
mockups or analogs (e.g. lunar habitat mock-ups), 
should be performed to provide more realistic 
identification of tasks and associated performance 
requirements. Cognitive workload analysis and human 
modeling of these evaluations and resulting tasks may 
prove useful in identifying additional necessary tools, 
software, training and testing needs to support future 
crews.  Identification of crew composition constraints 
and additional needs for future missions may also be 
accomplished via video monitoring of daily crew 
interactions and activities and the provision of on orbit 
questionnaires and debriefs to acquire the crews’ own 
perspective of aspects of crew composition.   
TRAINING 
Spaceflight crewmembers are provided with 
intensive preflight training, which includes both general 
day-to-day operations training, as well as complex and 
specialized training related to their roles and 
responsibilities within the crewed missions.   Training for 
ISS crews is provided using Part Task Training (PTT) 
techniques and classroom lessons, using simulators and 
mock ups, computer based training (CBT) or onboard 
training (OBT) modules.  The PTT is used to train flight 
crew and ground support personnel on the operation of 
the ISS onboard systems. The PTT provides a low cost 
part-task training environment by off loading training 
lessons from the high-fidelity trainers and simulators. 
Training is provided in structured training flows at the 
operator and specialist skill levels.  Operator level 
crewmembers are qualified for performing all user tasks 
for a system/operation/payload.  This includes 
maintenance, off nominal tasks and all tasks necessary 
to maintain the safety of the crew and vehicle.  Specialist 
crewmembers are qualified to perform all Operator 
tasks, with minimal ground support consultation, all 
technical maintenance tasks, all tasks specific to the 
Expedition, and all repair tasks and off-nominal 
procedures, as directed by the ground. Efforts are 
consistently being made to institute a more skill based 
training protocol versus task based methodology for ISS 
training.  However, ISS crews continue to comment that 
training is still too focused on a task based approach. In 
addition, simulators and mock-ups utilized for training 
have been an issue, due to the challenges associated 
with simulating 0-G conditions in a 1-G environment.  On 
orbit, the crew can fly through the volume and move 
around obstructions or protrusions in the translation 
paths.  On the ground, these facilities cannot completely 
represent the ISS onboard environment due to 1-G 
constraints, such as translations paths must be walked 
through not “flown” through.  These differences in 
representation of the actual environment can contribute 
to poor task performance and initial operational learning 
curves upon on orbit arrival.   
Lunar and Mars 
 New methodologies and training strategies can 
be addressed in terms of cross training for planetary 
missions. Specifically, to help understand how autonomy 
constraints will affect each crew’s tasks and the crew’s 
mission objectives. Once task analyses are completed 
and more detail is available on nominal required 
operational tasks, tools for ISS implementation and 
evaluation can be created.  Specifically, ISS crews could 
be asked to perform lunar or Mars specific Internal 
Vehicular activities (IVA) and evaluations, with 
standardized tools, to evaluate training requirements 
and expectations for future missions.  In addition, ISS 
crewmembers could be asked to conduct simulated 
operational scenarios with integrated constraints, such 
as communication latencies, off nominal emergencies, 
or redirection of necessary required tasks.  Related 
OBTs could then be administered to allow the 
crewmembers to evaluate the utility of certain training 
scenarios and products.  These simulated scenarios and 
the increased use of and reliance on onboard training 
protocols will provide an understanding of the crew’s 
ultimate training needs. The OBT and CBT evaluations 
may prove useful in defining what ground based training 
is critical to support these missions, reduce training time 
required on the ground, and what the crew can be 
expected to learn remotely.  Day in the life simulations, 
to mimic lunar and Mars habitat topology and 
operations, will also prove to be beneficial, but it is 
critical that any mockups used must be as hi-fidelity as 
possible to ensure accurate evaluation of each element. 
PROCEDURES  
Historically on ISS, procedures have been a 
problem for the crew primarily due to lack of usability 
and overly complex and detailed information content. As 
focus has shifted to a reduction in the amount of paper, 
supplies and configuration management needed, 
utilizing procedures electronically has become the 
preferred method of operations.  However, the shift from 
paper to electronic based procedures has highlighted 
human computer interaction issues associated with the 
format and content of the procedures and their 
transference to computer display systems.  Specifically, 
electronic procedures have been difficult to use because 
the crew has had to spend time navigating between 
various menus due to overly detailed and lengthy 
content.  This is increasingly problematic when tasks are 
not located close to a display and the crew has to 
physically navigate back and forth from the task to the 
display.   In many cases the content of the procedures 
has contributed to inadvertent procedure step-skipping 
and poor task execution (Baggerman et al., 2004).  In 
addition to overly detailed procedure steps, there has 
been excessive use of cautions and warning notations 
within procedures. This has contributed to the 
desensitization of the crew to many cautions and 
warnings in procedures and an unsafe situation on-
board ISS, i.e. accidental procedure step skipping and 
inattention to critical caution and warnings.  Overall, the 
method in which the information has been conveyed and 
the way the tasks were designed around the procedures, 
has lead to the occurrence of errors while using the 
procedures and during task execution (Rando et al., 
2007).  
 
Lunar and Mars 
 As we look ahead to a mission paradigm where 
there is less and less ground control and support, it will 
be important to focus not only on human centered 
design of hardware and systems but the tools that 
support the tasks.  Specifically, focus should be placed 
on the development of procedures and new methods of 
information conveyance to assist the crew in becoming 
fully autonomous operators.  It will be important to start 
utilizing the ISS to test new formats of procedures for 
tasks that have historically been difficult to complete, 
because they have required very long and complicated 
procedures. Particularly, the ISS will need to be used to 
test new formats of procedures that can be displayed on 
portable electronic devices, such as heads up 
technologies and display formats.  One important aspect 
procedure development will be the transition from relying 
on the written word to convey instructions to a method 
that relies primarily on schematics and drawings.  It will 
be necessary to use the ISS to evaluate how to better 
utilize computer software programs, e.g. speech 
recognition devices, to assist the operator in procedure 
execution, i.e. potentially remove the need for displays 
for some tasks that are less complex.  
MISSION PLANNING  
 Typically, ISS mission planning is predominantly 
controlled by the ground; however the crew is permitted 
and encouraged to make inputs to their daily schedules. 
The ground support teams provide the crew with the 
tools to view mission plans, but the majority of mission 
planning and scheduling is done on the ground.  With 
the exception of known communication latencies and 
occasional malfunctions, ISS crewmembers are rarely 
out of contact with the ground.  However, when 
communication is unavailable it can greatly impact 
mission planning and mission objectives.  In addition, 
contact capability with the ground has been critical for 
ISS crews as a habitability support, e.g. to allow for 
communication with family and friends.  Any 
communication latencies caused by increased distances 
from key communication points, such as the Earth, will 
require that the crew be capable of supporting each 
other and be trained to carry-out activities such as, 
diagnosing and treating a range of medical issues 
autonomously (e.g. illnesses such as flu, lacerations, 
trauma, toxic exposures, bone fractures etc).  In the 
event of an emergency, any impedance to quick and 
accurate communication and information could pose a 
threat to the crew returning the mission to a safe point 
and contribute to costly human errors.  
Lunar and Mars 
 Independent mission planning has not been 
critical for ISS crews, but will be significantly important 
as the level of mission autonomy increases for lunar and 
Mars missions.   Future missions will experience limited 
communication windows, long communication latencies, 
and limited bandwidth capabilities. ISS can be used to 
evaluate how mission planning and scheduling may be 
impacted.  Specifically, extended communication delays 
can be implemented during evaluations with ISS crews 
to address how these constraints will impact mission 
objectives and planning.   It will prove essential to 
purposefully put ISS out of communication or simulate 
communication latencies with the ground to study the 
affects of these delays on mission planning with limited 
ground support.  NEEMO, and other analog 
environments, should be utilized to begin testing 
electronic scheduling and mission planning tools.  It will 
also identify how communication latencies affect the 
ability of the crew to perform their tasks prior to ISS 
implementation.  Interactive scheduling system 
prototypes should be developed and tested to create a 
base line for operational comparison.  Specifically, the 
crew has the primary responsibility for maintaining the 
mission plan and ground just oversees as necessary 
and when possible.  Once these tools are developed 
and tested in the analog environments, they can then 
progress to implementation to ISS. These evaluations 
regarding crew independent mission planning will also 
help to define what the crew’s limitations for lunar and 
Mars will be in terms of remote emergencies, i.e. fire, 
medical care, depressurization, EVA issues etc.   
CONCLUSIONS 
 The lessons learned from long duration space 
flight activities, specifically ISS, has shown that lunar 
and Mars exploration poses many new challenges, 
some of which are yet to be identified.  With smaller 
vehicle spaces and new partial-gravity constraints, the 
Habitat Infrastructure and Support Systems will have to 
change and will not be as accommodating to poor task 
design as has been in a 0-g environment.  With partial-
gravity, adaptability of the human, in terms of 
complicated and inefficient layouts, will be reduced and 
uncomplimentary co-location of items will be 
exacerbated by new anthropometric concerns.  Each 
activity center of the spacecraft or habitat will need to be 
configured to allow the crew to be efficient and 
productive.  Longer duration missions, new mission 
objectives, and varied communication latencies, coupled 
with the effects of improper crew composition and poor 
interaction during missions may be detrimental.  Crews 
will need to be able to adapt to mission constraints at a 
moments notice and interact appropriately.  Crew 
composition via clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
must be determined prior to flight to allow for mission 
success.  Training will also need to fully support new 
crew compositions and crew autonomy with independent 
scheduling practices.  Procedures will be essential in 
supporting the new operation and training paradigms 
that the lunar and Mars mission introduce.  
Consideration will need to be given to new methods of 
information conveyance, while still achieving procedural-
style instruction and positive task execution.  Extended 
communication delays will require crews to plan and 
schedule mission tasks more independently based on 
communication and other mission constraints.  It will be 
important to focus on human centered design for all 
aspects of the lunar and Mars missions including: 
Vehicle Infrastructure and Support Systems, Crew 
Composition, Training, Procedures, and Mission 
planning.  Good human centered design practices will 
help to ensure the safety of the crew and future success 
in the exploration of new space territories.  
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